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The Hu-Wen Team’s CautiousReform Agenda
Since the Tiananmen crackdown of 1989, each ChineseCommunist Party (CCP) Congress—held every fiveyears to select the country’s leadership bodies and to set
new policies—has carried with it expectations that somehow, the
door to political reform may be opened a bit wider. Since Pres-
ident Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao took the helm follow-
ing the Sixteenth CCP Congress in November 2002, these rel-
atively dynamic Fourth-Generation honchos have done much to
elicit hopes that some elements of liberalisation associated with
late reformers Hu Yaobang 胡耀邦 and Zhao Ziyang
赵紫阳 may sooner or later be resuscitated. Even though the
Hu-Wen team has in the past couple of years adopted dracon-
ian measures to muzzle dissidents, close down offending NGOs,
and wield the proverbial big stick against forward-looking news-
papers and websites, a sizable number of liberal cadres and in-
tellectuals are still cautiously optimistic that Beijing will deliver
the goods at least regarding limited goals such as dangnei minzhu
党内民主, or “democracy within the Party.”((1)
It should be noted from the outset that throughout the first five
years of the so-called Hu-Wen xinzheng 胡温新政 (“new
deal”), the two leaders and their colleagues have repeated state-
ments made by late patriarch Deng Xiaoping and ex-president
Jiang Zemin that China would never adopt “Western-style re-
form” or institutions such as multi-party elections or the tripartite
division of powers among the executive, legislature and judici-
ary.((2) Premier Wen, whose portfolio is economics and not ide-
ology or politics, is generally regarded as the most “progressive”
among Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) members partly
due to his association with late Party chief Zhao. And in late
2006 and early 2007, Wen took the initiative to underscore the
CCP’s commitment to political reform, at least for the long haul.
For example, in an unusual article carried by Xinhua News
Agency in late 2006, Wen wrote that science, democracy, free-
dom and human rights were “not unique to capitalism” but were
“values that are all mankind hankers after in our long historical
progression.”((3) Similar sentiments were stated by the premier
during his post-National People’s Congress press conference in
March this year.
It is important to bear in mind, however, that the premier will
only entertain gradual, non-radical steps toward adopting demo-
cratic institutions such as one-person one-vote elections. The cau-
tiousness of Wen’s agenda is evident from what he told the
British media while visiting the country last year. “Democratic
construction, particularly direct elections, could only take place
gradually and incrementally according to the national conditions
of [individual] countries,” Wen said. He added that if the
masses can run a village properly through the electoral process,
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1. For a discussion of possibilities for political reform in the run-up to the Seventeenth CCP
Congress, see, for example, Kent Ewing, “China’s democracy debate: The end is nigh,”
www.Asiatimes.com (a Hong Kong-based web service), 25 July 2007; Joe Kahn, “Hu holds
fast to one-party rule in China in major speech,” International Herald Tribune, 29 June 2007.
2. For example, Jiang Zemin said in a speech to non-CCP elements in early 2002 that
Beijing “will never copy the two-party or multi-party system of the West.” See Xinhua
New Agency, 12 February 2002. The CCP’s opposition to Western democratic institutions
was also made clear in the State Council’s so-called White Paper on Democracy, enti-
tled “Building of Political Democracy in China,” released on 19 October 2005.
3. See Wen Jiabao, “On the historical tasks of the preliminary stage of socialism,” Xinhua
News Agency, 26 December 2006.
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The leitmotif of the much-anticipated Seventeenth CCP Congress in October 2007 was how to give substance to the
goal of “constructing a harmonious society.” However, the Hu-Wen leadership’s refusal to undertake real political
reforms, especially sharing power with “disadvantaged” socio-economic groupings, has exacerbated differences
across disparate classes and sectors. This article argues that “harmony” can hardly be attained while the Party—
which is in cahoots with monopolistic business groups—refuses to yield the tight grip it has on power and its ironclad
control over the nation’s resources.
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the same principle can “in future” be applied to a township, and
then a county, and a province.((4) It is understood that Beijing is
talking about a long-term time-frame for eventually developing
nation-wide elections. There are no indications that the Hu-Wen
team will revive experiments with upgrading direct elections from
the village to the town or township levels, although more than a
dozen towns or townships in provinces ranging from rich Guang-
dong to rural Sichuan experimented with direct polls to choose
their leaders in the last years of ex-president Jiang’s tenure.
Moreover, senior advisers to Jiang such as former Shanghai po-
litical science professor Wang Huning reportedly tried to per-
suade the leadership to consider a more rapid and substantial
pace towards holding direct elections.((5)
It is realistic to expect that only limited reforms will be carried
out until the end of the Hu-Wen leadership’s second five-year
term in 2013. These efforts at liberalisation have been designed
to attain the two major goals of the Hu-Wen xinzheng: realising
“scientific development” and “constructing a harmonious soci-
ety.” “Scientific development” is a code word for national devel-
opment that will take care of the needs of the majority of Chi-
nese, including members of the ruoshi tuanti 弱势团体, or dis-
advantaged classes. Thus, Beijing will strive to strike a balance
between economic and social policy: while pursuing high GDP
growth rates, central authorities will pay more attention to how
the new wealth will be distributed among the country’s disparate
sectors. A judicious balance will be struck between the needs
and aspirations of the haves and have-nots; between the require-
ments of the coast and those of the hinterland; and between the
hardware (for example, machinery, plants, ports and airports)
and the software (the education and health standards of ordinary
folks) of economic reform.((6)
The related ideal of a “harmonious society,” first introduced at
the Sixth Central Committee Plenum in late 2006, means a
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4. Cited in “Wen Jiabao meets representative from the British media,” China News Service,
6 September 2006.
5. For a discussion of the “time-table” for promoting direct elections in China, see, for
example, Willy Wo-Lap Lam, The Era of Jiang Zemin, Singapore & New York: Prentice
Hall, 1999, pp. 392-3.
6. For top CCP leaders’ views on “scientific development,” see, for example, Hu Jintao,
“Implement the theory of scientific development, and realise the speedy and good develop-
ment of the economy and society,” People’s Daily, 4 January 2006; Wen Jiabao, “Implement
scientific development in a comprehensive fashion,” People’s Daily, 17 April 2006.
A general overview of the 17th Chinese Communist Party Congress
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socio-economic order in which all Chinese can co-exist peace-
fully and in harmony. It entails the curtailment of social strife and
contradictions, which manifested themselves in the 87,000
“mass incidents”—a reference to riots, demonstrations and other
disturbances—that took place in 2005 (the last year for which
such statistics are available). On a deeper level, “constructing a
harmonious society” presupposes that the CCP leadership will
play the role of a “mediator” and “balancer” among the interests
and aspirations of disparate socio-economic groupings. As the
Sixth Plenum communiqué noted, the authorities should “coor-
dinate and regulate the interest relationships among different sec-
tors, and adequately handle contradictions in society.” It further
called upon central and regional authorities to set up “scientific
and effective mechanisms” for mediating among different vested
interests as well as defusing contradictions.((7)
While no radical or thoroughgoing forms of democracy are in
the works, Hu and his colleagues have made it clear that they
will try to promote social justice, in particular a relatively level
playing field for both the privileged and disadvantaged sectors.
According to statements made by senior cadres and think-tank
members, the CCP leadership will undertake reforms in the fol-
lowing three areas in order to accomplish the aforementioned
goals. The first initiative is bureaucratic streamlining and promot-
ing administrative efficiency within the Party and government.
The second consists in a circumscribed but potentially significant
power-sharing with elite political and socio-economic groupings
outside of the CCP. The third—and probably most important—
reform is “intra-Party democracy,” particularly allowing China’s
72 million party cadres and members a bigger say in choosing
leaders—and in thrashing out Party and state policies. After an
adequate level of dangnei minzhu has been achieved, demo-
cratic institutions and ethos could conceivably spread across the
length and breadth of the nation. Analysis of Limited Administra-tive and Polit ical  Reforms – andtheir Potential  Fall-out  
Promoting administrative efficiency and improving crisis management
President Hu is a firm believer in “scientific socialism.” This
means that despite the demise of the international communist
and socialist movements, it is possible for China to achieve so-
cialist goals provided the Chinese administration is efficient, de-
voted, and non-corrupt.((8) For reasons of space, we shall only ex-
amine efforts made by Beijing since 2002 to rationalise the Party
and government apparatus and render it more “combat ready”
to serve the goals of creating and maintaining a harmonious so-
ciety. 
On the Party side, Hu and colleagues such as Vice-President
Zeng Qinghong, who is in charge of Party affairs, have attained
some degree of success in curtailing party bureaucracy. One
salient effort is the reduction of the number of vice Party secre-
taries for CCP committees that are running provinces, cities,
counties and villages. In the nation-wide reshuffle of the leader-
ship corps of all regional administrations in late 2006 and early
2007, the number of vice Party secretaries was reduced by 806;
5,165; and 41,476 at city, county and village level respectively.((9)
Moreover, in a number of “experimental cities” such as Pudong
and Shenzhen, CCP departments that overlap with those of the
municipal administration have been pared down drastically.
There have also been experiments testing how to ensure that
provincial and municipal cadres responsible for fighting corrup-
tion or pollution will not be subject to the intimidation or con-
straints imposed upon their colleagues or superiors within the
same regional administrations.((10)
On the government side, the State Council has been less than
successful in efforts to abolish the entire layer of the town or
township administrations—which lie between the county and vil-
lage governments. This is despite Premier Wen’s announcement
immediately upon becoming premier in March 2003 that this
bold measure was the only way to promote efficiency while less-
ening the tax burden on peasants.((11) It is estimated that the abo-
lition of a town or rural township will result in 70-odd local-level
cadres being taken off the payroll—and a saving of about three
million yuan a year. By the end of 2003, the number of towns
nationwide had decreased by 375 to 20,226, while townships
had shrunk by 575 to 18,064. Moreover, 950 towns and town-
ships were merged. The pace of streamlining, however, slowed
from 2004 onward. In the first nine months of that year, merely
864 towns and townships were slashed or merged.((12) Appar-
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7. Xinhua noted in a dispatch on “accidents and mass incidents in 2006,” 18 July 2007,
that such incidents had decreased compared to 2005. However, no specific figures were
given. For the Sixth Plenum communiqué, see “The CCP Central Committee Plenum’s
Resolution on the Construction of a Harmonious Society,” Xinhua News Agency, 11
October 2006.
8. For a discussion of Hu’s concept of “scientific socialism,” see for example, Willy Wo-Lap
Lam, Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era, New York: M E Sharpe, 2006, pp. 40-44.
9. See “Where have the vice secretaries gone after the streamlining of the regional party
committees?”, China News Service, 3 August 2007.
10. Cited in Bi Zheng, “Disciplinary affairs secretaries in the four directly administered cities
are directly appointed by CCP central Authorities,” Guangzhou Daily (official regional
daily), 28 December 2006.
11. Cited in “Premier Wen stresses importance of administrative streamlining,” Xinhua
News Agency, 30 May 2003.
12. See “800 million yuan saved through cutting and merging 864 towns and rural town-
ships,” China News Service, 15 November 2004.
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ently owing to entrenched opposition from the grassroots, Wen
and his advisers had by 2006 stopped mentioning this reform in
the media. 
Of more direct relevance to the Hu-Wen team’s bid to construct
a harmonious society is the creation of a comprehensive, multi-
pronged yujing 预警 (“advance-warning”) cum rapid-response
mechanism to forestall and tackle developments and events that
would disrupt socio-political harmony: these range from horren-
dous traffic and mining accidents to riots, disturbances and acts
of urban terrorism. The underlying philosophy of nipping the
causes and manifestations of disharmonious socio-political phe-
nomena in the bud is the idea of ju’an siwei居安思危 (“be-
ware of dangers while in the midst of plenitude”), which was
spelt out by Hu in 2003. “The leadership collective must have
a cool-headed awareness of China’s conditions,” Hu said. “We
must boost our awareness of [possible] troubles and disas-
ters…We must positively address various risks and challenges.”
Hu also underscored the imperative of assessing and forestalling
risks. “We must lower the adverse impact of unfavorable circum-
stances to ensure stable development and [national] security,”
the supremo added. “We will succeed if we can forestall prob-
lems, otherwise we may fail.”((13)
At the highest level, Hu and Wen have set up numerous perma-
nent or ad hoc bodies—sometimes called leading groups or co-or-
dinating committees—in Zhongnanhai, to wrestle with domestic
and foreign crises. Subject matters and issues have ranged from
the worsening law-and-order situation to the shortage or rising
prices of strategic minerals, raw materials, as well as grain and
meat. From 2003 onwards, crisis management and rapid-re-
sponse “command centres” have been set up in every large and
medium-sized city. The computer networks of these outfits were
to be linked to each other—as well as to the Ministry of Public
Security and other relevant units—to facilitate quick deployment
of resources to resolve a crisis.((14) The Beijing municipal leader-
ship, for example, formed a Crisis Management Command
Centre in the wake of the SARS epidemic in early 2003. The
centre has since been beefed up to handle incidents ranging from
epidemics and earthquakes to terrorist attacks. Practically all
other large cities have similar systems that boast ultra-modern
surveillance and crowd-control gadgets, including state-of-the-art
equipment imported from Western countries.((15) Hu and com-
pany have become firefighters committed to nipping the first
signs of instability in the bud. Symptomatic of cadres’ “high de-
gree of crisis awareness” is that from mid-2003 onwards, officials
of all levels have to keep mobile phones turned on 24 hours a
day. There are also stipulations that after a major accident such
as a mining disaster or big fire, responsible cadres must be on
the scene in two to three hours. A key criterion for promotion—
or demotion—for local-level officials is their ability to maintain
stability or “harmony” in their areas of jurisdiction.((16)
Co-opting socio-economic elite groups intothe party-and-government apparatus 
Despite the immense differences between Hu and Jiang, the
younger supremo has largely incorporated the Third-Generation
leader’s “Theory of the Three Representatives” 三个代表.
This unorthodox theory was used by Jiang in 2001 to absorb el-
ements within the “new classes”—such as private businessmen,
professionals, and haigui pai 海归派, or well-trained “re-
turnees” from abroad—into the CCP. The unstated reason of-
fered by Jiang and Hu is that only well-educated, IT-savvy citi-
zens—and not barely literate peasants or migrant workers—are ca-
pable of bringing the “the highest productivity and the most ad-
vanced culture” to the Party and China.((17)
From 2002 to 2007, the Hu-Wen team has taken pains to induct
cadre-entrepreneurs—mostly senior managers of quasi-state
owned firms such as the three giant oil monopolies and the state
banks—into high-level Party and government jobs. By mid-2007,
senior cadres who first distinguished themselves in the world of
business include the Party Secretary of Hainan, Wei Liucheng
卫留派; Party Secretary of Wuhan Miao Yu 苗圩; and the
Minister at the State Production Safety Supervision Administra-
tion Li Yizhong 李毅忠. All eyes will be on the new Central
Committee to be licked into shape at the Seventeenth Congress.
There are expectations that in addition to state entrepreneurs,
several private businessmen who are also Party members may
make it to this policy-setting organ.((18)
Equally significant was the appointment in mid-2007 of two non-
CCP members as State Council ministers. Dr Wan Gang
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13. Cited in “Hu Jintao stresses the importance of seizing opportunities in order to push for-
ward development,” People’s Daily, 29 January 2003.
14. Cited in Zhong Xuebing, “Beijing studies crisis management mechanisms,” Wen Wei Po
(a Beijing-run Hong Kong daily), 28 March 2004.
15. Sun Fangcan, “Beijing prepares for establishment of crisis management command cen-
ter,” China News Service, 23 June 2003; “Rapid-response systems to be set up in the
cities in five years,” Ming Pao (a Hong Kong daily), 24 May 2004.
16. The CCP leadership has also instituted a “cadre responsibility system” whereby senior
officials have to take political responsibility for mishaps in areas within their jurisdiction.
Ministerial-level officials and state entrepreneurs who were forced to resign due to
grave mistakes or incidents have included the former Minister at the State Environment
Protection Agency Xie Zhenhua and the Chairman of Sinopec Corp., Li Yizhong.
17. For a discussion of the controversial nature of Jiang Zemin’s “Theory of the Three
Represents,” see, for example, Willy Wo-Lap Lam, Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era,
op. cit., pp. 65-69.
18. At the Sixteenth CCP Congress, quite a few state entrepreneurs as well as the bosses of
semi-private companies were already elected to the Central Committee as full or alter-
nate members; they included General Manager of China Aerospace Science and
Technology Corp., Zhang Qingwei; President of Haier Group, Zhang Ruimin; and
Chairman of Baosteel Group, Xie Qihua.
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万钢, an expert in industrial engineering and later college pres-
ident, was named Minister of Science and Technology; and
medical Professor Chen Zhu 陈竺 became Minister of Health.
Wan is a leader of one of the eight “democratic parties,” politi-
cal entities formed in the 1930s and 1940s which were co-opted
by Mao in the 1950s. Wan’s appointment marked the first time
in 35 years that a democratic-party politician had attained minis-
terial rank. This development has brought some substance to the
much-ballyhooed doctrine called the “co-operation and consulta-
tion between the central authorities and the eight democratic
parties under CCP leadership.”((19) While individual members of
these eight democratic parties have become more vocal since the
early 1990s, it is true that these outfits are often disparaged as
“flower vase” or decorative organs that survive at the pleasure of
the CCP. The parties depend on the CCP for operating funds,
and many of their leaders are also CCP members. Moreover,
the role that non-CCP politicians can play is circumscribed even
when compared to the early 1950s, when several democracy-
party politicians became vice-premiers and ministers.((20)
For China’s partisans for political reform, it is particularly galling
that the Hu-Wen leadership has cleaved to a “top-down,” no-
blesse oblige type of approach to expanding the CCP’s power
base as well as consultation procedures. Despite the commit-
ments that Fourth-Generation leaders have made to boosting the
stature and improving the rights of disadvantaged groups such as
peasants and factory workers, the latter have had negligible rep-
resentation on governing councils such as the CCP Central
Committee. Equally significantly, non-CCP affiliated trade
unions or farmers’ unions have remained illegal despite protests
from international labor organisations. This is despite the fact
that worker and peasant associations could at least function as
safety valves through which members of ruoshi tuanti can air
their grievances. Unions could also enable these bona fide pro-
letarians to effectively bargain with the state and big business
groups for higher wages or higher procurement prices for farm
produce.((21)
Boosting “dangnei minzhu” and “dangneihexie”
While introducing the ideal of “constructing a harmonious soci-
ety” at the Sixth Central Committee plenum, Hu played up the
principle of dangnei hexie 党内和谐 or “harmony within the
Party.” Dangnei hexie is just the flip side of the coin of dangnei
minzhu: this means that while the Leninist principle of “democ-
ratic centralism” is still being observed, Party cadres and senior
Party members will have more say in the selection of their lead-
ers—as well as the overall formulation of policy.((22) If dangnei
minzhu is successful, the CCP leadership might be more predis-
posed to liberalising the political structure and processes in other
sectors of the polity. 
In the first year of their administration, the Hu-Wen team made
a series of symbolic gestures in the direction of dangnei minzhu
and dangnei hexie. For instance, Politburo meetings were for the
first time reported in the media (even though the official Xinhua
News Agency only gave the briefest of information). Then from
the Second Central Committee plenary session onwards, Hu
has delivered his state-of-the-Party address in the form of the
Politburo’s report to the Central Committee. In the context of
Party rituals, this signifies that the Hu-led Politburo holds itself
accountable to the Central Committee, which voted it into office
at the Sixteenth Congress.((23)
From late 2006 onwards, the propaganda machinery has made
much of the fact that the Seventeenth Congress will be a show-
case for dangnei minzhu. In July this year, the authorities re-
leased the names of the 2,217 daibiao 代表 (delegates or
deputies) to the Congress: it was the first time in the Party’s his-
tory that the identities of these deputies were made known well
ahead of the congress. Moreover, Xinhua and other media
claimed that a larger degree of democracy was exercised when
ordinary Party members in different units and regions nation-
wide chose these daibiao earlier this year. The composition of
the deputies had undergone notable changes: 28.4% were
“front-line” cadres or workers of different professions, four per-
centage points more than at the Sixteenth Congress. There were
445 female representatives and 242 deputies hailing from the
ethnic minorities, respectively 63 and 12 more than those attend-
ing the Sixteenth Congress. Most significantly, the CCP leader-
ship has promised a more substantial version of cha’e xuanju
差额选举 (elections where the number of candidates is larger
than the posts up for grabs) when the deputies select Central
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19. See Cui Shixin, “Non-communist personages as ministers,” People’s Daily, 10 July 2007.
20. Most of the non-CCP ministers and vice-premiers were classified as “rightists” and
ruthlessly persecuted during the Anti-Rightist Campaign that started in 1957. Their trag-
ic fate has, right through to the current epoch, dealt a strong blow to the morale of mem-
bers of the eight democratic parties, most of whose leaders are only too aware of the
lack of tolerance of the CCP.
21. There are about 150,000 “Farmers’ Professional Associations” in rural areas that are
approved by authorities; however, the FPAs, which involve about 3% of all peasants, only
handle technical matters such as providing help with mechanisation. See “Strength in
numbers: farmer associations,” www.chinaeconomicreview.com site, April 2007,
http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/cer/2007_04/Strength_in_numbers:_farmer_as
sociations.html. Bona fide farmers’ unions have sprouted in a couple of provinces such
as Hunan (the birth place of Mao), and these organisations have acted as peasants’ lob-
byists, much to the chagrin of local CCP authorities.
22. “Expatiating on the ‘Resolution’ of the Sixth Plenum: to use intra-Party democracy to imple-
ment a harmonious society,” Commentary by Xinhua News Agency, 18 December 2006.
23. Cited in Jiang Xun, “Beijing seeks checks and balances at the Seventeenth Congress,”
Yazhou Zhoukan (a Hong Kong weekly), 12 August 2007.
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Committee members at the Congress. The “margin of elimina-
tion,” which was 10% when competitive elections were first in-
troduced at the Thirteenth Congress, will be increased to
15%.((24)
On the eve of the Congress, the Party’s spin-doctors have also
floated speculation that cha’e xuanju may be possible when the
Central Committee picks the future Politburo at its first plenary
session one day after the conclave closes.((25) Political analysts in
Beijing say the CCP is under pressure to take serious steps on
intra-Party democracy partly due to much bolder strides made in
the same area by the Vietnamese Communist Party in 2006.
However, at a time when it is widely thought that Hu is ob-
sessed with the imperative of elevating protégés from his power-
ful Communist Youth League Faction to the Politburo and the
PSC, the room for Party officials and the rank-and-file to freely
choose their leaders will be limited.((26)The  Cost  of  Shelv ing  Polit icalReform: Exacerbating SocialDisharmony and WorseningAdministrative Malaise
The Hu-Wen team’s failure to pick up the threads of political re-
form spun in the mid-1980s by late leaders Hu Yaobang and
Zhao Ziyang is one key reason for Beijing’s failure to maintain
political harmony. The CCP leadership’s vaunted “putting peo-
ple first” dictum is confined to enlarging Beijing’s largesse for the
ruoshi tuanti. For example, agriculture tax was cancelled in
2005, and Beijing is spending more on boosting rural infrastruc-
ture, including “software” items such as health and education.
More significantly, the social security net has been gradually ex-
tended to the countryside. For instance, dibao, or minimal-level
cost-of-living subsidy, is now available to more than 100 million
peasants.((27) This new dispensation will go some way toward re-
lieving the hardship of the up to 200 million Chinese who still
live below the poverty line if United Nations yardsticks are used.
However, mere state subventions are no substitute for genuine
power sharing. It is only when the weak and disadvantaged so-
cial groupings are given the same opportunity to take part in de-
cision-making—and take home a fair share of the fruits of eco-
nomic development—that real and lasting harmony is possible. 
The perpetuation of an unequal playing f ield
The goals of both “scientific development” and a “harmonious
society” can only be reached through the introduction of a level
playing field—or a body of unbiased and transparent rules of the
game—for competition among China’s increasingly fractious
socio-economic sectors. In particular, what Beijing admits to be
a cuguang 粗犷 (“rough and quantity-oriented”) kind of eco-
nomic growth must not result in the exploitation of the weak by
the strong. As discussed earlier, the CCP has to acquit itself of
the task of being a judicious referee-cum-mediator to ensure fair
play among the classes. 
The power equation in Chinese politics of the mid-2000s, how-
ever, runs counter to the Hu-Wen team’s slogans such as “putting
people first” or promoting social justice. In their first five-year
term, the Hu-Wen team has in effect strengthened what pundits
call the unholy alliance between Party cadres and big business.
This is attested to by the large number of retired Party officials
as well as “princelings” (the offspring of Party elders) playing im-
portant roles in the business world. Cadres and princelings also
figure prominently among the top executives running the 160 or
so state monopolies and oligopolies. The latter, including the oil
and electricity firms, airlines and banks—hold assets that are
close to 60% of GDP.((28) Affiliates of this unholy alliance have
monopolised the benefits accrued from nearly twenty years of
unbridled economic growth, while the disadvantaged sectors
seem to be getting little more than the crumbs.
Other observers have commented on the Latin-Americanisation
of China. This is a reference to the CCP elite’s reliance on the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the People’s Armed Po-
lice (PAP) to deflect if not suppress protests from dissidents, and
particularly, social groupings who have lost all hope of getting
their fair share of the pie. It is no accident that as a reward for
their service, the Hu-Wen leadership has rewarded the armed
forces not only with double-digit annual budget increases but also
considerable decision-making powers. While the PLA and
PAP have a combined strength of slightly more than three mil-
lion officers—they are expected to retain their traditional 20%
share of Central Committee slots at the Seventeenth Congress.((29)
It seems evident, therefore, that the CCP is no longer capable
of playing the role of an impartial mediator or referee. The
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24. “Six characteristics of the deputies to the Seventeenth CCP Congress,” Wen Wei Po, 5
August 2007.
25. See Jiang Xun, “Beijing seeks checks and balances at the Seventeenth Congress,” op. cit..
26. For a discussion of Hu’s efforts to elevate his protégés to the Politburo at the
Seventeenth Congress, see, for example, Benjamin Lim, “China appraises next genera-
tion leaders for loyalty,” Reuters, 12 May 2007.
27. For a discussion of latest policies on extending the social-security net, see, for example,
Huang Ju, “Central authorities to spend 200 billion yuan to ensure fair distribution of
social-security subsidies,” People’s Daily, 18 April 2007.
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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
Party’s existence is predicated upon a symbiotic relationship with
powerful business and political groupings both inside and outside
China. And the latter, including quasi-private corporations as
well as Western multinationals, seem willing to uphold or at least
acquiesce in the CCP’s ruling-party status as long as they are
able to retain or enlarge their business and other vested interests
under the status quo. 
The sad rea l it y o f  weak and  ine ff ec t i vegovernance
Despite the apparent effort that the Hu-led Politburo has put
into raising the level of “scientific decision-making” and efficient
implementation of policies, the quality of overall administration
has deteriorated. One only has to look at two areas that have a
gargantuan impact on national strength and people’s livelihood.
One consists of hongguan tiaokong 宏观调控 (macro-eco-
nomic control and adjustment) measures taken by the State
Council since 2004 to cool down overheating in the economy,
particularly in sectors such as the property and stock markets.
The other is Beijing’s losing battle against environmental despo-
liation: economic losses due to ecological and environmental fac-
tors now add up to 10% of GDP, according to official esti-
mates.((30)
Since early 2004, the Wen cabinet has tried hard to curb irra-
tional exuberance in different aspects of the economy, particu-
larly excessive fixed-assets investments, and speculation in prop-
erties and in stocks and shares. While Wen had at the start of
2005, 2006 and 2007 set the goal of annual GDP growth at be-
tween 8% to 9%, the result has been in excess of 11%. More-
over, there is no sign of the state having gained better control
over investment, the money supply, or runaway prices. This is de-
spite the fact that the central bank has raised the interest rates—
as well as the capital adequacy requirement of commercial banks
– several times. And with inflation having grown to 5.7% for the
month of July 2007, there are signs of the State Council resort-
ing to government fiats to reassert control.((31)
The picture of the country’s environment is much bleaker, with
experts from both China and abroad wringing their hands over
the phenomena such as stinking rivers and lakes as well as fast-
expanding deserts. Peasants in more than 60% of the country’s
rural counties and villages have no access to clean drinking water.
The underground water systems in more than 50% of cities are
described in official documents as “severely polluted.” Acid rain
falls over 30% of Chinese territory. About 27.5% of the country
is hit by different degrees of desertification and soil erosion. And
the World Bank estimated in mid-2007 that 750,000 Chinese
“die prematurely” every year due to pollution.((32)
Here again, policies and injunctions from Beijing have proven to
be ineffective. None of the environmental targets contained in
the Tenth Five-Year Plan (2000-2005) were met. Of all the
provinces and major cities, only Beijing was able to pass muster
concerning pollution criteria set for the year 2006: cutting energy
use per unit of GDP by 4% and decreasing the discharge of pol-
lutants by 2%. Opposition from regional “warlords” as well as in-
dustrial lobbyists has killed Beijing’s efforts to impose “green
GDP” standards on the localities.((33)
Even the authorities have admitted that failure to control or min-
imise the negative fallouts of cuguang economic growth has ex-
acerbated the hardship of ordinary folks. By 2006 and 2007, for
example, even members of the urban middle class are moaning
under the yoke of heavy mortgages. And the double-digit in-
creases in the prices of different kinds of foodstuffs are sure to
further stoke the anger and frustration of the ruoshi tuanti. At the
same time, environmental despoliation has become a significant
root cause of the tens of thousands of “mass incidents” every
year. The large-scale demonstration in mid-2007 by middle-class
residents of Xiamen against the construction of a chemical fac-
tory has shown that gripes and discontents have spread from
peasants to urban dwellers with substantial incomes.((34)
Should large-scale unrest break it, it is unlikely that the vaunted
“advance warning” and “rapid-response” mechanisms put to-
gether under the Hu-Wen xinzheng can keep chaotic forces at
bay. The authorities have claimed that the number of “mass in-
cidents” in 2006 had declined—although no new figures have
been given. Anecdotal evidence suggests that local-level cadres
have become numb and inept simply because they have been
asked by central and provincial authorities to guard against too
many kinds of tufa 突发 incidents. In July this year, cadres run-
ning Tengchong 腾冲 County in Yunnan province were taken
to task because they had been slow to mobilise rescue teams to
the site of a mudslide, which killed 29 inhabitants. In response,
a senior county official said that from January 2007 onwards, he
and his colleagues had been asked by regional authorities to de-
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Chinks in the Armour of the Hu Jintao Administration
sign yujing 预警 measures to handle 120 possible types of
mishaps. The result is that, in the official’s words, “our yujing
systems exist only on paper”: the county government simply lacks
the personnel and other resources to tackle so many eventuali-
ties.((35)Conclus ion:  Why  the  Goal  o f a  Harmonious Society  RemainsI l lusory
The Hu-Wen leadership’s apparent unwillingness to entertain a
broader vision of political reform is all the more deplorable be-
cause even a minor liberalisation of their Leninist statecraft could
make a disproportionately big contribution to building a harmo-
nious society. What is needed are not necessarily radical and dra-
matic steps such as the speedy introduction of multi-party poli-
tics. For example, a more tolerant attitude toward the inchoate
civil society could go a long way in alleviating inter-class contra-
dictions and acrimony. 
NGOs as well as individual activists have since the late 1990s
been doing voluntary and valuable work for thousands of mem-
bers of ruoshi tuanti. Since the late 1990, a rash of NGOs spe-
cialising in “green” issues and human rights have been perform-
ing valuable services for victims of land expropriation and envi-
ronmental degradation. These NGO leaders or individual ac-
tivists are all well-educated professionals who have no desire of
challenging the political order. For example, since the turn of the
century, Shanghai lawyer Zheng Enzhu 郑恩宠 had donated
his time and resources to helping poor Shanghai residents resist
efforts by developers—who enjoy the support of corrupt offi-
cials—to evict them from their humble dwellings. Zheng’s whis-
tle-blowing efforts eventually led to the incarceration of Zhou
Zhengyi 周正毅, the rags-to-riches speculator who had many
Shanghai cadres and princelings in his pocket. However, Zheng
was himself arrested on trumped-up charges—and he received
the same three-year jail term as Zhou in 2005. By mid-2007, a
few dozen or so “activist lawyers” like Zheng have either been
locked up or put under 24-hour surveillance by police or state-se-
curity agents.((36)
While talking about Beijing’s uphill battles against corruption
and pollution, officials have often conceded that they need the
support and participation of the public: at the very least, media
scrutiny as well as hues and cries raised by motivated citizens
could alert the authorities of impending disasters. In fact, civic-
minded whistle-blowers are often more effective than the Hu-
Wen leadership’s yujing system in forestalling major disruptions
of socio-political harmony. Vice-Minister at the State Environ-
ment Protection Agency Pan Yue 潘岳, a liberal cadre, pointed
out in early 2007 that “we need broad public input [for fighting
pollution], because the public are the biggest stakeholders in the
environment.”((37)
Unfortunately, the majority of government departments—espe-
cially provincial and municipal administrations—regard green ac-
tivists as troublemakers, or even anti-government agitators. Take
the scandal over badly polluted Lake Tai 太湖, which made in-
ternational news in mid-2007 because its water had been en-
veloped by poisonous blue algae. Wu Lihong 吳立红, a 39-
year-old environmentalist, had for the past 15 years called on the
local government to shut down dozens of factories that had
pumped untreated effluents into the lake. Even as local authori-
ties were cracking the whip on these errant factories, however,
Wu was arrested by local police for alleged “blackmail” and dis-
turbance of public order. A similar fate has befallen activists who
took the lead in organising protests against polluters who in many
cases enjoyed the protection of corrupt local officials.((38)
Facts and analysis presented in this paper have lent credence to
the argument that the Hu-Wen team’s excessively narrow ap-
proach to political reform will impede their bid to usher in a har-
monious society. The frame of reference of dangnei minzhu is
too restrictive for the purpose of reinvigorating central and re-
gional CCP committees—and rendering them suitable vehicles
for fostering social harmony. Efforts by the CCP to reach out to
other socio-economic sectors and groupings such as businessmen
or members of the eight democratic parties may raise the qual-
ity of decision-making to some extent. However, Beijing’s refusal
to talk to representatives of the ruoshi tuanti—which form the
great majority of Chinese—on an equal footing means that poli-
cies designed to promote the peaceful and symbiotic co-existence
of myriad classes and interest blocs will be biased in favor of
holders of vested interests. It is true that in the foreseeable fu-
ture—and certainly within Hu and Wen’s second five-year term—
Beijing can keep the forces of instability and even revolt at bay
thanks partly to the party’s still formidable control mechanisms.
However, real progress in establishing a harmonious society
could remain illusory in the absence of thoroughgoing political
reform and power-sharing. •
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